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Abstract:  
In cross-border acquisitions, the differences between the bidder and target corporate governance have an important impact on 
the takeover returns. Our country-level corporate governance indices capture the changes in the quality of the national corporate 
governance regulations over the past 15 years. When the bidder is from a country with a strong shareholder orientation (relative 
to the target), part of the total synergy value of the takeover may result from the improvement in the governance of the target 
assets. In full takeovers, the corporate governance regulation of the bidder is imposed on the target (the positive spillover by law 
hypothesis).  In  partial  takeovers,  the  improvement  in  the  target  corporate  governance  may  occur  on  voluntary  basis (the 
spillover by control hypothesis). Our empirical analysis corroborates both spillover effects. In contrast, when the bidder is from 
a country with poorer shareholder protection, the negative spillover by law hypothesis states that the anticipated takeover gains 
will  be  lower  as  the  poorer  corporate  governance  regime  of  the  bidder  will  be  imposed  on  the  target.  The  alternative 
bootstrapping hypothesis argues that poor-governance bidders voluntarily bootstrap to the better-governance regime of the 
target. We do find support for this bootstrapping effect. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Cross-border merger and acquisition (M&A) activity  has increased significantly over the last 15  years 
(Moeller  and  Schlingemann,  2005). Expansion  through  cross-border  acquisitions  enables  companies  to  exploit 
differences in tax systems and to capture rents resulting from market inefficiencies, such as national controls over 
labour and resources markets (Scholes and Wolfson, 1990; Servaes and Zenner, 1994). An additional source of 
takeover value in cross-border M&As may be induced by improvements in the governance of the bidding and target 
firms as a result of spillovers of corporate governance standards between the two firms.  
Wang  and  Xie  (2007)  show  that  both  bidder  and  target  firms  benefit  from  corporate  governance 
improvements in  domestic  US  mergers  and  acquisitions. They  use  the  firm-level  shareholder rights indices of 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) and show that takeover synergies increase with the differences in the index 
between  the  bidder  and  the  target.  We  hypothesize  that  the  scope  for  potential  improvements  in  corporate 
governance  is  even  greater  in  cross-border  M&As  as  the  difference  between  the  bidder  and  target  quality  of 
corporate  governance  is  amplified  by  the  significant  variation  in  national  corporate  governance  standards. 
Therefore, our main question is: Do differences in the quality of corporate governance standards between the 
bidder and target countries explain part of the expected value creation in cross-border takeovers? In other words, is 
there  a  valuation  effect  of  cross-border  spillover  of  corporate  governance  standards  (and  more  specifically  of 
investor protection) ? 
Why would we expect such a spillover valuation effect for corporate governance? In international law, a 
full takeover leads to a change in nationality of the target firm such that the acquirer’s corporate governance 
regulation  will  apply  to  the combined company,  in  effect  replacing  the target  corporate  governance (Bris and 
Cabolis, 2007a). When the bidder is subject to better corporate governance regulation than the target, the acquisition 
may result in an improvement in corporate governance (e.g. enhanced shareholder orientation) in the target. If this 
improvement is expected to generate value, the abnormal share price returns of both the bidder and target should 
reflect such value creation. We call this hypothesis the positive spillover by law hypothesis. ‘Positive’ refers to the 
corporate governance improvement for the target as a result of the full takeover by the bidder. In other words, the 
better the bidder corporate governance, the higher are the returns to the bidder and target firms from the takeover. 
Likewise, we define the negative spillover by law hypothesis: when the bidder governance standards are below 
those of the target, the abnormal returns will be lower as the governance standards of the target will now be less 
strict.  
As  the  negative  spillover  by  law  effect  is  expected  between  a  bidder  in  a  country  with  low  investor 
protection and  a target in a country with stricter corporate governance regulation, as the induced poor investor 
protection by the bidder may lessen the quality of corporate governance of the target. This could reduce the value of 
the target assets in the hands of the bidder. However, there is an alternative hypothesis: bidders can abide by the 
stricter  regulation  that  the  target  is  subject  to.  We  call  this  the  bootstrapping  hypothesis:  bidders  voluntarily 
bootstrap their corporate governance regulation to a higher level.
1 As such, firms can contract privately on the 
                                                 
1 One could somehow compare this to the bonding hypothesis: some firms seek a cross-listing on an exchange with stricter 
investor protection/listing requirements. This allows these firms to commit credibly to protect the shareholders’ interests (see   2 
optimal level of investor protection.
2 If the bidder shareholders intend to pursue such bootstrapping to a higher level 
of corporate governance, the value of the merged firm may actually increase which will also be reflected in the 
bidder share price at the takeover announcement. Bootstrapping may occur in both full and partial acquisitions, but 
the valuation effect may be stronger in partial takeovers whereby a stake of less than 100% of the voting rights is 
acquired and the target still remains listed on its national stock exchange.
3 The bootstrapping valuation effect may 
also be stronger in takeovers with all-equity offers or mixed bids as (some of) the target shareholders will then 
remain  involved  with  the  merged  company  and  may  actively  resist  managerial  actions  reflecting  a  reduced 
shareholder orientation (Starks and Wei, 2005).  
International law prescribes that the positive spillover by law effect is to take place in a full takeover, which 
leads to a change in the target firm’s nationality. Nonetheless, partial takeovers may also lead to a similar spillover 
effect, which we call the spillover by control hypothesis. Although the target firm is not fully absorbed by the bidder 
in a partial acquisition, the bidder may still impose its own corporate governance standards on the target, provided 
that the bidder standards are stricter than the target’s. In contrast, if the bidder standards are less strict than the 
target’s, the bidder has to comply (locally) with the target corporate governance law and the listing regulations (in 
case the target remains listed on a national stock exchange).    
The  main  conclusion  from  our  empirical  analysis  is  that  the  positive  spillover  by  law  hypothesis  is 
supported whereas the negative spillover by law hypothesis is not. The bidder and target takeover announcement 
returns are positive when the former’s governance standards are stricter than the latter’s. This implies that the 
stricter governance imposed on the target is expected to lead to value creation, possibly to an increased focus on 
shareholder value and the reduction in managerial private benefits of control. In contrast, when the bidder corporate 
governance standards are less strict than the target’s, neither the bidder nor the target returns are lower. While this 
evidence goes against the negative spillover by law hypothesis, it does not contradict our bootstrapping hypothesis: 
it seems that poor-governance bidders bootstrap to the better-governance regime of the target, experiencing a share 
price increase. Importantly, the effect is only valid for partial acquisitions or, in other words, in deals which still 
involve some of the target shareholders (who did not sell out) and in which the target firm remains listed on the 
stock exchange in the country of the target.  
The spillover by control hypothesis holds when the differences between the bidder and target governance 
regulation have a positive effect on anticipated gains of partial takeovers. The spillover effect from a bidder from a 
country  with  stronger  shareholder  protection  on  the  target  explains  part  of  the  value  creation  expected  at  the 
announcement  of  the  partial  takeover.  The  potential  benefits  from  the  improvement  of  the  target  corporate 
governance  are  shared  by  both  the  bidding  and  target  firms’  shareholders:  both  the  bidder  and  target  returns 
                                                                                                                                                                            
e.g. Coffee, 1999 and Doidge et al., 2006). Such bonding is credible to the market as it involves high costs (complying to 
different accounting standards, listing regulation, governance standards) and comprises a legal obligation.  
2 A counterexample whereby a firm moves towards less shareholder-orientation is given by Bris and Cabolis (2007b): they 
show that  Aventis, the  firm arising  from the  merger  of German  Hoechst  and  French  Rhone-Poulenc,  borrowed  from the 
corporate governance regimes of both firms, resulting in a more protected company than with the French default legal system of 
investor protection.  
3 In the case of cross-border mergers, a bidder is entitled to subject a foreign-owned subsidiary to its local corporate law, 
irrespective of the domicile of the subsidiary (Bris and Cabolis, 2007a, citing Muchlinski,1997). When less than 100% of the 
shares of the target are acquired by the foreign firm, the target firm remains operating under the law of its home country. 
Furthermore, the extraterritoriality principle in international law states that a state can assert jurisdiction over its nationals 
abroad. However, the extraterritoriality principle does not apply when a foreign firm acquires 100% of the company’s shares.     3 
increase. Our results are robust with respect to several model specifications that control for potential endogeneity 
problems. 
Our results also support the view that national corporate governance regulation has a significant impact on 
the flow of cross-border takeovers. In particular, we find that firms from countries with weak corporate governance 
regulation are more likely to invest abroad rather than domestically, confirming earlier results by Doidge et al. 
(2007) and Benos and Weisbach (2004). We also find that bidders are more likely to acquire firms abroad if 
minority shareholder protection in their home country is strong. This result is in line with the argument by Goergen 
et al. (2005) that strong protection of minority shareholders makes corporate takeovers costly and hence forces 
companies to look for potential M&A targets abroad, in countries with weaker (minority) shareholder protection. 
Strong creditor protection in the home country also has a positive effect on the international takeover activity. This 
may result from the relation between creditor protection and a firm’s access to debt financing (La Porta et al., 1998). 
Martynova and Renneboog (2007a) show that debt financing is indeed frequently used in cross-border M&As. 
Therefore, cross-border M&As are more likely to be made by bidders that have access to less expensive debt capital 
which prevails in countries with strong protection of creditor rights.  
Finally, most of our other results on the effect of the relative transaction size, free cash flow, hostility, 
means of payment, diversification strategies, stock-price runup, differences in economic development, geographical 
closeness and language relatedness of the bidder and target, the level of corruption, and other characteristics are in 
line with the findings in the earlier literature.  
This paper contributes to the literature in two ways.  
First,  we  answer  the  question  how  or  through  which  channels  cross-border  mergers  and  acquisitions 
generate value. Not just purely economic characteristics (of the bid, the target, and the bidder) but also the spillover 
of corporate governance standards between the bidder and the target explain part of the takeover premiums or the 
anticipated value (abnormal announcement returns). The impact of national corporate governance standards on the 
shareholder wealth effect in cross-border M&As has been previously studied in Bris and Cabolis (2007a) and Bris, 
Brisley and Cabolis (2008), Starks and Wei (2005), Kuipers et al. (2003), and Rossi and Volpin (2004). These five 
studies investigate the valuation effects of corporate governance from different perspectives and arrive at different 
results. Our paper is closest to the study by Bris and Cabolis (2007a) and Bris et al. (2008). The authors show that 
takeover premiums in cross-border deals increase with the difference in shareholder protection and the quality of 
accounting standards between the bidder and the target. They report that this effect is significant only in M&As 
when the target changes its nationality (full acquisitions). In contrast, our results reveal that the improvement in the 
target shareholder protection has a positive effect on takeover synergy irrespective of the type of takeover. Our 
results thus reveal that governance-related takeover synergies may not only arise from a spillover by law effect but 
also from spillover by control and bootstrapping effects.   
The second contribution is that our analysis is based on new corporate governance indices. Our country-
level indices are more elaborate than the indices developed by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 
(henceforth LLSV) and employed in the studies mentioned above. With the help of 150 corporate lawyers from 32 
European countries, we have created a corporate governance database that comprises the main changes in corporate 
governance regulation in all European countries over the last 15 years. For each country, we quantify corporate law,   4 
stock exchange regulation and corporate practices
4, and measure their effectiveness in mitigating the conflicts of 
interest  between  the  various  corporate  constituencies:  management,  majority  and  minority  shareholders,  and 
creditors. Our indices reveal that corporate governance regulation has been substantially reformed in virtually every 
European country since the early 1990s. Therefore, it is important to note that, in contrast to previous studies, all 
legal indices employed in this paper are time-varying and reflect changes in the legal environment.  
There are several reasons why we focus on country regulation (rather than firm-level regulation). First, it is 
virtually impossible to code the content of corporate charters, to collect the amendments and to gather all major 
shareholder decisions of AGMs for such a large group of firms. These firms are situated in a heterogeneous group 
of countries with varying degrees of transparency and disclosure problems. Second, empirical evidence reveals a 
high correlation between corporate governance at the firm-level and at the country-level. Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz 
(2007) analyse the variation in a cross-section of firm-level corporate governance indices and conclude that most of 
the variation can be explained by country characteristics. They argue that countries matter so much because they 
influence the costs that firms incur to bond themselves to good governance and the benefits they receive from doing 
so. The authors also state that firms with concentrated ownership (de facto the vast majority of listed firms in 
Continental Europe) invest less in firm-level governance mechanisms, as the incentives of the major shareholders to 
expropriate are lower.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the data sources and sample design. 
Section III presents the empirical results while section IV concludes. 
 
II. Sample Description 
 
We select our initial sample of European acquisitions undertaken during the fifth takeover wave (1993-
2001) from the Mergers and Acquisitions Database of the Securities Data Company (SDC).
5 The SDC data is 
filtered down to intra-European cross-border takeovers, whereby both the acquirer and the target are from countries 
within Continental Europe and the UK. Our sample also includes deals involving firms from Central and Eastern 
Europe  (including  Russia).  For  reasons  of  comparison,  we  also  collect  information  on  domestic  mergers  and 
acquisitions in Continental Europe and the UK. We retain only those cross-border and domestic M&As that satisfy 
the following requirements:  
 
(i)  The transaction involves a change in control
6;  
                                                 
4 We also capture generally accepted corporate practices in as far as they are stricter than the regulation. For instance, non-
voting shares are legal in the UK, but are not used by any firm listed on the London Stock Exchange. Therefore, we consider 
the UK as a country where the one-share-one-vote is upheld.  
5 The quality of the SDC data is verified by comparing its information on the announcement date, the company’s country of 
origin, the transaction value, payment structure, share of control acquired, bid completion status, and the target’s attitude 
towards the bid with information from the news announcements stored in LexisNexis, the Financial Times, and Factiva. We 
uncovered inconsistencies in one or more records in 36% of the observations of the SDC database, which we subsequently 
corrected.   
6 We require either that the transaction leads to a combination of the firms or that the acquirer who held less than 50% of the 
target’s stock prior to the transaction acquires majority control.   5 
(ii)  The shares of the bidder or the target firm (or of both) are traded on a Continental European or UK 
stock exchange;  
(iii)  Both parties participating in the M&A transaction are independent corporations;
7  
(iv)  Neither the bidder nor the target is a financial institution (bank, unit trust, mutual fund or pension 
fund);  
(v)  The period between two consecutive bids by the same acquirer is at least 300 trading days;
8  
(vi)  Financial and accounting data for at least one of the participants of the transaction are available in 
DataStream or in the Amadeus, Fame or Reach databases. 
 
Our final sample of domestic and cross-border M&A announcements consists of 2,419 deals involving 
firms from 29 European countries. Cross-border M&As represent one-third of the sample (737 deals). Table 1 
reports the sample distribution by country for the bidding and target firms. The most active cross-border acquirers 
are British, German, and French firms, which cumulatively account for 49% of all cross-border M&As. Firms from 
the UK, Germany and France are also most frequently the targets in cross-border acquisitions (37% of all cross-
border M&As). Not to be underestimated is the cross-border M&A activity involving Scandinavian firms, which 
represents 23% and 17% of all cross-border acquirers and targets, respectively. 
The domestic M&A activity by UK, German, French, and Scandinavian firms substantially exceeds their 
involvement in cross-border takeovers. In contrast, companies from the Benelux countries, Austria, and Ireland are 
more frequently involved in cross-border rather than in domestic M&As. Relative to the other major economies in 
Continental Europe, Southern Europe (Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) has a remarkably low domestic and cross-
border takeover activity. In cross-border M&As, Southern European firms are more frequently targets (of German, 
British and French bidders) than bidders. Another interesting observation relates to Eastern and Central European 
countries that have joined the European Union since 2004. Many firms from these new member states are acquired 
by West-European bidders, predominantly from neighbouring countries (Scandinavia, Austria, and Germany). In 
contrast, the participation of Central European firms as bidders in cross-border acquisitions is small, as is the 
domestic takeover market in that region.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
 
III. Empirical Results 
A. Variable construction 
 
The next subsections discuss the measurement of four categories of variables: (i) the bidder and target 
announcement  returns  (the  dependent  variables),  (ii)  corporate  governance  indices, (iii)  measures  of  corporate 
governance  spillover  effects  (our  key  explanatory  variables),  and  (iv)  the  bidder-,  target-,  and  deal-specific 
characteristics (our control variables). The definitions of variables and data sources are summarized in Appendix I. 
 
                                                 
7 The absorption of subsidiaries is not included, nor are divestitures and management buyouts. 
8 The reason for this restriction is that we want to avoid contamination of the windows used to estimate the systematic risk.    6 
A1. The Bidder and Target Announcement Returns 
 
We  measure  the  short-term  wealth  effects  at  the  takeover  announcement  using  the  event  study 
methodology. For each bidding and target firm, we compute the daily abnormal returns realized over the period 
starting 1 day prior and ending 1 day subsequent to the day of the public takeover announcement.
9 The takeover 
announcement wealth effect is the sum of these daily abnormal returns. We also consider longer event windows, 
such as [-5, +5] and [-60, +60]. Daily abnormal returns are the difference between realized and market model 
benchmark returns. Our market model is based on the MSCI-Europe index and its parameters are estimated over 
240 days, starting 300 days prior to the acquisition announcement.
10 To test the significance of the estimated 
abnormal returns, we use both parametric and non-parametric tests as discussed by Brown and Warner (1985) and 
Corrado (1989), respectively. 
       As panel A of Table 2 shows, the three-day cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) is 0.83% and 
0.47% for the subsamples of domestic and cross-border bidders respectively. Both figures are significantly different 
from  zero  at  the  5%  level  and  the  difference  in  the  CAARs  between  the  two  subsamples  is  also  statistically 
significant.
11  This  result  confirms  findings  of  recent  empirical  studies  that  cross-border  bidders  somewhat 
underperform their domestic peers (see e.g. Moeller and Schlingemann, 2004; Denis et al., 2002). In contrast, 
targets in cross-border takeovers experience significantly higher returns than targets in domestic bids. For the three-
day window centred on the bid announcement, cross-border target firms accumulate abnormal returns of 12.6 % 
compared to 11.5% for domestic targets. Goergen and Renneboog (2004) document similar differences for large 
intra-European M&As. 
To investigate the influence of the legal environment on the takeover wealth effect, we compare the CAARs 
for sub-samples of bidders (targets) across countries of different legal origins. Countries from the former communist 
block are classified according to their (staged) accession to the European Union. Panel B of Table 2 reveals the 
systematic differences in the bidder and target CAARs by legal origin. Whereas bidders of German or Scandinavian 
legal origin earn significant positive returns in cross-border M&As, their counterparts of English or French legal 
origin  earn  more  modest or  even insignificant  returns,  and  bidders  from  recent EU Accession countries  incur 
negative returns. For the target firms, we observe that companies of English or Scandinavian legal origin yield the 
highest announcement returns, which are almost 2.5 times higher than the returns of target companies of French or 
German legal origin. Remarkably, the CAARs to the target firms from the former communist block countries are 
not significantly different from zero.  
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
                                                 
9  The  event  day  is  either  the  day  of  the  announcement  or  the  first  trading  day  following  the  announcement  in  case  the 
announcement is made on a non-trading day. 
10 Our estimates of the abnormal returns are robust with respect to the geographical scope of the market index (local, European-
wide, and worldwide index) and the estimation model of the benchmark returns (the estimated beta adjusted for mean-reversion 
(Blume, 1979), and non-synchronous trading (Dimson, 1979)). Changing the market index or the estimation model does not 
materially change any of the results in the remainder of the paper.   
11 We (conservatively) only report the non-parametric tests. The significance levels of the parametric tests corroborate the non-
parametric ones but the former lead to higher levels of significance.    7 
A2. Corporate Governance Standards Indices 
 
To measure the quality of corporate governance standards in the bidder and target firms’ countries we 
construct a number of indices
12. With the help of 150 corporate lawyers from 32 European countries (as reported in 
Appendix II), we create a corporate governance database comprising the main aspects of and changes in corporate 
governance  regulation  in all European  countries (including  Central  and Eastern  Europe)  since  1990.  For each 
country, we quantify the regulation mitigating the conflicts of interests between the main corporate constituencies: 
management versus shareholders, majority versus minority shareholders, and creditors versus shareholders. We 
construct the following three indices (see also Martynova and Renneboog, 2007b). All these indices are rescaled to 
take values within the [0, 10] interval. 
(i)  The  shareholder  rights  index  is  based  on  shareholders’  ability  to  curb  managerial  opportunistic 
behaviour. The index measures the degree of shareholder orientation of a national regulation. The index increases 
with the number and quality of legal provisions that provide shareholders with effective power to appoint and 
dismiss the board of directors and to control most of the important corporate decisions on, for instance, equity issues 
or anti-takeover measures. We also take into account the regulatory provisions that ensure that the board of directors 
acts as an independent body operating on behalf of all shareholders and monitors top management. Provisions that 
address the quality of information on the management and the frequency of disclosure of accounting information are 
also  considered.  A  higher  index  score  represents  a  higher  likelihood  that  management  acts  in  the  interest  of 
shareholders and hence reflects better corporate governance standards with respect to shareholder protection. 
(ii) The minority shareholder protection index hinges on the regulatory provisions that increase the relative 
power of the minority shareholders in the presence of strong majority shareholders. In a firm with concentrated 
control, it is possible that the dominant shareholder extracts private benefits of control by influencing managerial 
decisions for his own benefit (see e.g. Durnev and Kim, 2005). This may lead to the expropriation of minority 
shareholders’ rights. We quantify the regulatory provisions related to minority shareholder protection (e.g. board 
representation,  minority  claims,  extraordinary  general  meetings,  blocking  minorities),  the  one-share-one-vote 
principle (dual class shares, voting caps, break-through rule, equal treatment principle), ownership transparency, 
and  the  relative  decision  power  in  case  of  a  takeover  threat.  A  higher  index  score  signifies  that  minority 
shareholders’ interests are better protected.  
The shareholder rights and minority shareholder protection indices are positively correlated because they 
both reflect to some degree the underlying quality of shareholder protection in a country. However, they are based 
on different institutional characteristics.  
(iii) The creditors rights index hinges on the regulatory provisions that allow creditors to force repayment 
more easily, to take possession of the collateral, or even to gain control over the firm in case of financial distress. In 
creating this creditor rights index, we closely follow the approach of LLSV and investigate the regulation related to 
the violation of debt covenants (deviations from the debtor priority ranking in case of bankruptcy), the possibility 
                                                 
12 These indices overcome some of the limitations of the LLSV indices. First, our indices are based on a broader definition of 
corporate governance regulation than that used by LLSV. Second, our indices are dynamic: they capture the many regulatory 
reforms on a yearly basis since 1990. Furthermore, we use functional approach to construct the indices, which differs from the 
comparative approach employed by LLSV (1998). For a detailed discussion of the limitations and advantages of our indices see 
Martynova and Renneboog (2007b).   8 
for debtors to impose restrictions on borrowers (e.g. limitations on filing for reorganization/liquidation), and the 
creditors rights in financially distressed firms (e.g., automatic stay on assets). The index also captures the difference 
between creditor-oriented and debtor-oriented bankruptcy codes: we augment the creditor rights index for a country 
with a pure liquidation code by one, while leaving the index unchanged for a country with a debtor-oriented code.
13 
The reason is that a bankruptcy code that facilitates reorganization focuses on corporate survival, usually at the 
expense of the (more senior) creditors. A higher index score reflects stronger creditor rights, i.e. higher corporate 
governance standards with respect to creditor protection.  
The constituents of each index and their coding are given in Appendix III. 
It is important to note that a system with strong legal enforcement may substitute for weaker regulation as 
well-functioning  courts  can  effectively  resolve  disputes  between  corporate  constituencies  (LLSV,  1998). 
Conversely, a law designed to uphold the rights of e.g. minority shareholders may be eroded in case the judiciary 
does not function effectively. To address these problems, we multiply the above indices by an index capturing the 
quality of law enforcement. We use the rule of law index developed by the World Bank, which we rescale to take 
values within the [0, 1] interval. The rule of law index measures the extent to which agents have confidence in and 
abide  by  the  rules  of  society,  which  include  the  effectiveness  and  predictability  of  the  judiciary  and  the 
enforceability of contracts. A higher score of the index signifies that a national judicial system is more effective.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
Panel A of Table 3 reports the mean values of the corporate governance indices multiplied by the rule of 
law  index.  (Henceforth,  when  we  refer  to  the  corporate  governance  indices,  we  refer  to  the  original  indices 
multiplied by the rule of law index). The indices are reported by legal origin and for every fifth year over the period 
1990-2005. The panel  shows  that  in  1995  –  the  reference  year  of  the  LLSV  indices – our  shareholder  rights 
protection index ranks countries in a similar order as it does the LLSV anti-director index. That is, countries of 
English legal origin have the highest corporate governance standards with respect to shareholder protection. They 
are followed by the countries of Scandinavian legal origin, and then by the countries of French and German legal 
origin. The panel also shows that there have been substantial changes in corporate governance standards in virtually 
every country in Europe over the past 15 years. The changes relate to all three dimensions of corporate governance 
standards addressed in this paper. However, in 2005, the countries of English legal origin still provide the highest 
quality of shareholder protection. Over time, shareholder rights and minority shareholder protection have increased 
throughout Continental Europe and the UK, whereas creditor protection has been reduced in Western Europe. In the 
mean  time,  many  Continental  European  countries  have  improved  their  legal  system  and  moved  closer  to  the 
standards set by the English legal system.  
Panel B of Table 3 shows the mean values of the corporate governance indices for the countries of bidding 
and target companies measured in the year of the acquisition. It shows that, in contrast to the targets in cross-border 
acquisitions, bidding firms are from countries with better legal protection of (minority) shareholders. This pattern is 
consistent with the evidence by Rossi and Volpin (2004): targets in cross-border acquisitions are typically from 
                                                 
13 Chapter 11 in the US is the prototype of a debtor-oriented code. In the 1990s, many bankruptcy codes have been reorganized 
and now frequently include two tracks: a debtor-oriented part (e.g. administration in the UK) and a pure liquidation code. We 
classify such bankruptcy codes as debtor-oriented.    9 
countries with poorer standards of shareholder protection than the bidder. The difference in creditor rights between 
the bidder and target countries seems to have no impact on the flow of cross-border M&As.  
The correlation matrix in Table 4 shows that the value for the target shareholder rights index is positively 
correlated with the bidder and target takeover returns. The value of the target minority shareholder protection index 
is also positively correlated with the target returns but is negatively correlated with the bidder returns. The table also 
reports the correlations between the indices and the main variables that are used in the regression models below. 
 [Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
A3. Corporate Governance Spillover Effects 
 
We measure the potential corporate governance spillover effect in cross-border mergers and acquisitions in 
two ways. First, we take the difference between the indices of the bidder and target countries (the differences-
approach). This variable captures the scope of the potential improvement in corporate governance if the target firm 
with the lower governance standards were to adopt the higher standards of the bidder. The quality of corporate 
governance standards is measured by means of the three indices discussed above; i.e. we measure it with respect to 
the protection of shareholders, minority shareholders, and creditors (while taking in to account the quality of the 
judiciary). Table 4 shows that the shareholder-rights difference is positively correlated with the target takeover 
returns.  
Second, we construct indicator variables capturing the direction of corporate governance spillover effects: 
from the bidder to the target and vice versa (the indicator-variable approach). The indicator variable for the spillover 
of better governance standards from the bidder to the target  equals one if the bidder index is above the median 
index and the target index is below the median (the positive spillover by law / spillover by control effect), and is 
zero otherwise. The indicator variable for the spillover of better governance standards from the target to the bidder 
(the bootstrapping effect) equals one if the bidder index is below the median and the target index is above, and is 
zero otherwise. Alternatively, this variable may indicate the spillover of the bidder low governance standards to the 
target firm (the negative spillover by law effect), if its parameter estimate has the inverse sign. Overall, the indicator 
variables denote whether a bidding company is likely to improve or worsen its own governance and the governance 
in a target firm. It should be noted that the median value of each index is measured across all countries in a 
particular year and both the bidder and target indices are compared to the same median.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
Table 5 partitions all M&As by the quality of corporate governance standards. It shows that the majority of 
cross-border bidders are from countries with superior standards of investor protection. More than 76% of all cross-
border bidders are from countries with a shareholder rights index above the median (Panel A). This percentage is 
even higher (about 93%) when we consider minority shareholder protection (Panel B). Panel C shows that the 
sample is evenly split between bidders from countries with below- and above-median creditor rights. A similar 
picture arises for target companies: they tend to be from countries with above-median  investor protection. These 
patterns stand in sharp contrast to those documented by Bris and Cabolis (2007a) who find that the majority of 
bidders and targets are from countries with below-median investor protection. This difference may be due to the   10 
sample composition. In contrast to Bris and Cabolis (2007a), our sample excludes M&As that involve firms from 
outside Continental Europe and the UK. Another rationale for the observed differences is that our classification is 
based on our dynamic corporate governance indices whereas Bris and Cabolis (2007a) use the static LLSV indices.    
Table 5 shows that bidders from legal systems with below-median investor protection mainly acquire target 
firms from systems with above-median legal protection. Similarly, target firms from legal systems with below 
average investor protection tend to sell their shares to foreign acquirers coming from systems with superior legal 
protection.  
 
A4. Other Determinants of the Bidder and Target Returns 
 
We consider three categories of additional factors that may influence the bidder and target returns: the 
characteristics of the bidder and target firms, the features of the takeover deal, and the characteristics of the bidder 
and target countries.  
 
Bidder and Target Characteristics: 
The  bidder  characteristics  that  we  control  for  are  firm  size,  Q-ratio,  leverage,  cash  flow,  and  pre-
announcement stock price runup. The size of the bidder is included as a proxy for managerial hubris (Roll, 1986), as 
larger acquirers tend to overpay in takeovers (Moeller et al, 2004). Therefore, the bidder returns are expected to 
decrease with  firm  size. The  bidder Q-ratio  is  a proxy  for  the  firm’s  growth  potential  and  quality  of internal 
corporate governance. Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1989) and Servaes (1991) document higher returns for bidders 
with higher Q-ratios. In contrast, Moeller et al. (2004) find a negative relationship between bidder returns and Q-
ratio for their sample of M&As from the 1990s. Therefore, the expected effect of the bidder Q-ratio on returns is 
ambiguous. We also include cash flow and leverage to control for acquisitions driven by free cash flow motives 
(Jensen,  1986).  Bidders  with  high  cash  flow  and  low  leverage  are  more  likely  to  make  value-destroying 
acquisitions. Finally, we include the bidder pre-announcement stock price runup to control for the bidder’s prior 
stock performance.  
The target characteristics that we include as control variables are leverage and cash flow, as a bidder is 
likely to pay higher premiums for targets with lower leverage and higher cash flows. For the analysis of (public) 
target CARs, we also include the target Q-ratio and pre-announcement stock price run-up to control for its growth 
opportunities and prior stock performance respectively. 
 
Deal characteristics: 
Both the theoretical and empirical M&A literature have shown that the following transaction attributes 
affect the bidder and target takeover returns: the form of and the attitude towards the bid (opposed bids, unopposed 
tender  offers,  friendly  M&As),  the  legal  status  of  the  target  firm  (listed  versus  privately-held),  the  industry 
relatedness  of  the  bidding  and target  firms  (a focus  versus  diversification strategy  of the  bidder), the  type  of 
acquisition (full versus partial acquisition), the means of payment (all-cash, all-equity, mixed offer), and the relative   11 
deal size.
14 It is argued that the market interprets all these pieces of information as a signal of the quality of the 
bidding and target firms and of the potential value creation in the takeover, which triggers share price adjustments. 
Therefore, to capture the effect of this signal we also control for the above deal characteristics in our models.  
 
B. Controlling for the Selection Bias 
   
We recognize that a decision to participate in a cross-border acquisition is an endogenous choice made by 
the bidding and target firms and these endogeneity issues may affect the conclusions of our analysis. In particular, 
Rossi and Volpin (2004) find that bidders and targets from countries with high shareholder protection are more 
likely  to  be  involved  in  domestic  rather  than  cross-border  M&As.  Therefore,  we  expect  that  a  cross-border 
acquisition involving a bidder or a target from a country with high shareholder protection will occur only if the 
takeover synergies are sufficiently high to overcome all additional costs arising from integrating with a foreign 
firm.
15 This implies a positive relationship between the bidder and target shareholder protection indices and the 
announcement stock returns.    
Therefore, to control for the sample-selection bias, we employ Heckman’s (1976, 1979) procedure. By 
applying a Probit analysis to the sample of all European bidding firms involved in domestic and cross-border 
acquisitions, we estimate the probability that a firm will undertake a cross-border rather than a domestic acquisition. 
The resulting parameters are used to compute Heckman’s λ (Mill’s ratio) for each bidding firm in our sample. We 
subsequently include Heckman’s λ as an additional regressor into the regressions on the bidder returns. Similarly, 
we estimate the probability that a target firm is involved in a cross-border rather than domestic acquisition by 
computing  Heckman’s  λ  and  including  it  into  the  target  returns’  regressions.  Although  the  bidder  and  target 
selection  equations  seem  very  similar,  they  refer  to  different  flows  of  foreign  direct  investments.  The  bidder 
equations  estimate  the  determinants  of  the  investment  outflow  from  the  country,  whereas  the  target  equations 
estimate the determinants of the investment inflow to the country.  
The explanatory variables of the two selection equations (presented in Table 6) are based on previous 
studies on the determinants of foreign direct investments and international financial integration (see e.g. Pagano et 
al., 2002; Sarkissian and Schill, 2004; Claessens and Schmukler, 2007). First, we include the characteristics of the 
bidding/target firms (size, leverage, cash flow, and Q-ratio) and the non-negotiated features of the intended takeover 
(public/private target, industry focus/diversification, the period within the takeover wave). Second, we also include 
macro variables such as GDP growth, income per capita, and the level of corruption in the bidder/target country. We 
expect bidding firms to initiate M&As abroad (rather than domestically) when their home countries offer a poor 
investment  environment,  which  is  proxied  by  low  economic  growth  and  high  levels  of  corruption.  An 
underdeveloped  M&A  market  resulting  from  various  obstacles  such  as  takeover-unfriendly  regulation  may  be 
another reason that motivates firms to acquire foreign targets. Therefore, we also include a proxy variable for the 
scope of domestic M&A activity in the country. Finally, the impact of the regulatory environment on the decision to 
acquire abroad is captured by our corporate governance indices. 
                                                 
14 For an overview of the evidence on the wealth effect of M&As and its determinants, see Jensen and Ruback (1983), Jarrell et 
al. (1988), Agrawal and Jaffe (2000), Bruner (2003), and Martynova and Renneboog (2007c). 
15 For the discussion of additional costs associated with cross-border takeovers see e.g. Denis et al. (2002) and Moeller and 
Schlingemann (2004).    12 
The estimates of the selection equations of the bidding and target firms reveal interesting results with 
respect  to  the  impact  of  the  regulatory  environment  on  the  flow  of  cross-border  M&A  activity  (Table  6).  In 
particular, a bidding firm is more likely to make a cross-border acquisition if it is from a country with low standards 
of shareholder rights. The result supports the view  that firms from countries with  weak corporate governance 
regulation are more likely to invest abroad rather than domestically (Doidge et al., 2007, Benos and Weisbach, 
2004). We also find that bidders are more likely to acquire firms abroad if minority shareholder protection in their 
home country is strong. This result is in line with Goergen et al. (2005) who argue that strong protection of minority 
shareholders makes corporate takeovers very costly and hence forces companies to look for potential M&A targets 
in countries with weaker minority shareholder protection. Strong creditor protection in the home country also has a 
positive effect on the international acquisition activity. This may follow from the positive relationship between 
creditor protection and a firm’s access to debt financing (LaPorta et al, 1998). Martynova and Renneboog (2007a) 
show that debt financing is frequently used in cross-border M&As. Therefore, cross-border M&As are more likely 
to be made by bidders who have access to inexpensive debt capital which prevails in countries with strong creditor 
rights.  
Unsurprisingly, the selection equation for the target firms shows that a target is more likely to sell its shares 
to a foreign bidder if the standards of shareholder protection in the target country are low and the standards of 
creditor protection are high.  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
C. Regression Results 
 
C1. The Bidder Returns 
 
The Impact of Corporate Governance Regulation on the Bidder Returns 
 
We  start  our  analysis  with  the  bidder  returns  regressions  that  include  the  bidder  and  target  corporate 
governance indices in levels, while controlling for the fact that making a cross-border acquisition is an endogenous 
decision (selection bias problem). Model 1 of Table 7 shows that the effect of the bidder and target national 
governance standards on the bidder returns is insignificant. The coefficients remain insignificant in Model 2 after 
controlling for growth potential, leverage, share price run-up, means of payment and many other characteristics of 
the deal, the target, the bidder and the countries of the bidder and target. We also fail to find any significant 
coefficients when we re-estimate this model including one of the corporate governance indices at the time (see 
Models 4-6). Overall, the evidence suggests that, apart from its impact on the decision to acquire a firm abroad (see 
section B), corporate governance regulation has no significant effect on the takeover returns to the bidding firm’s 
shareholders.  
Most of our results with respect to the control variables are consistent with previous empirical findings (see 
e.g. Moeller et al., 2004; Bris and Cabolis, 2007a; Starks and Wei, 2005). Specifically, we observe that (i) the 
bidder size has a significantly negative effect on the bidder returns suggesting that large bidders are more likely to 
make poor takeover decisions; (ii) the bidder Q-ratio has no significant effect on the bidder returns; (iii) the proxies   13 
for free cash flow - the bidder cash flow and leverage - have the expected (but insignificant) impact on the bidder 
returns (respectively, a negative and positive effect) which indicates that there is little evidence that cross-border 
acquisitions occur as a result of empire building; (iv) the bidder returns are significantly lower for hostile takeovers 
suggesting that the bidder shareholder fear overbidding in case of opposition by the target firm; (v) the returns are 
also lower for acquisitions involving equity payments (signalling overvaluation of the bidder shares), for public 
targets, for diversifying mergers (leading to a diversification discount), and for full takeovers (acquisition of 100% 
of the voting shares); (vi) the bidder pre-announcement stock-price run-up has a significantly positive effect on the 
bidder announcement returns; (vii) the bidder returns are also higher when the bidder and target countries are 
neighbours or belong to the same language group, as both may enhance transparency or induce trust;
16 (viii) the 
differences in economic development between the bidder and target countries is not correlated to the bidder returns; 
and (ix) the level of corruption in the target country has an insignificant effect on the bidder returns.   
All estimated models reveal that Heckman’s λ is significant confirming that ignoring the selection bias may 
induce estimation problems. To rule out any further possibility that our results are driven by the endogeneity of the 
control variables, we also re-estimate model 7 excluding the corporate governance indices. Our results are upheld.   
     [Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
The Impact of Corporate Governance Spillover Effects on the Bidder Returns 
 
Whereas Table 7 concentrates on the impact of corporate governance regulation on the bidder returns in 
cross-border  acquisitions,  we  now  switch  to  the  question  whether  potential  corporate  governance  spillover  is 
reflected in the bidder returns. We do not report the parameter estimates of the control variables in Table 8, as they 
are similar to those reported in Table 7. As in previous sections, we correct the models of Table 8 for sample-
selection biases. We now primarily focus on the potential improvement (or deterioration) of target firm corporate 
governance standards as a result of the takeover and its effect on the bidder returns. 
In Panel A of Table 8, we measure the scope for potential corporate governance spillover by the differences 
between the bidder and target corporate governance indices. In line with Bris and Cabolis (2007a), the parameter 
coefficient shows that the shareholder-rights difference has a positive, albeit insignificant, effect on the bidder 
CARs. A significantly positive coefficient would be consistent with the spillover by law hypothesis which states that 
the improvement in the corporate governance of the target firm via the transfer of the bidder governance standards 
is a source of synergistic gains in corporate takeovers.  
The insignificance of the coefficients may be due to the fact that not only bidding companies from countries 
with superior corporate governance standards may benefit from cross-border M&As but also bidders from countries 
with low investor protection. These may bootstrap their corporate governance standards to a higher level, namely 
that of the target firm. To disentangle the different directions of the spillover effect, we apply an indicator-variable 
approach. Panel B of Table 8 reports the results of the regressions that include an indicator variable capturing 
M&As involving a bidder with corporate governance standards above the median and a target with standards below 
                                                 
16 This result is interesting as it suggests that acquisitions of companies belonging to similar cultures lead to a higher value 
creation. The evidence is in spirit of Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2006 and 2007) who show that international transactions are 
more common between firms from countries that display a higher level of cultural similarities.    14 
the median. We also include an indicator variable that captures the opposite case: a bidder with low standards and a 
target with high investor protection. While the first variable is a proxy for the improvement of the target firms’ 
corporate governance (the positive spillover by law and the spillover by control hypotheses), the second variable is a 
proxy for the improvement of the bidder corporate governance (the bootstrapping effect) or for the dilution of the 
governance of the target if the bidder imposes its lower standards (the negative spillover by law hypothesis). 
The  regression  results  from  models  1-4  (panel  B)  show  that  the  coefficient  on  the  indicator  variable 
capturing the improvement in the target shareholder rights is positive and statistically significant (at the 1% level). 
This is consistent with the positive spillover by law (and spillover by control) predictions that acquisitions of firms 
with poor shareholder orientation by firms with a strong shareholder orientation generate abnormal returns for the 
bidder through the imposition of better corporate governance on the target.  
Model 1 also shows that the bidder returns are positive and significant when the target has a stronger 
shareholder orientation than the bidder. The fact that the bidder shareholders react positively to this type of deal is 
congruent with the fact that the bidding firm may adopt a higher level of shareholder orientation on a voluntary 
basis.
17 This increased shareholder orientation is then anticipated by the bidder shareholders, as reflected in the 
announcement returns. However, the significance of this bootstrapping effect disappears after taking into account 
the characteristics of the target, the bidder, the deal and countries of the bidder and target. 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
 
C2. The Target Returns 
 
The Impact of Corporate Governance Regulation on the Target Returns 
 
We  first  focus  on  whether  corporate  governance  standards  in  the  bidder  and  target  countries  have  a 
significant effect on the target returns (after controlling for the sample-selection bias described in section B). Table 
9 shows that the target returns strongly increase with the quality of shareholder protection in the target country. The 
coefficient on the target shareholder rights index is positive and statistically significant in all model specifications. 
The evidence suggests that target companies from countries with better shareholder protection are able to extract 
higher premiums from the bidding firms, which is also consistent with Rossi and Volpin (2004) but not with Bris 
and Cabolis (2007a). 
When we focus on minority shareholder protection by excluding shareholder and creditor protection indices 
(model 5), minority shareholder protection in the target country is still positively associated with the target returns. 
This implies that powerful minority shareholders are able to extract an additional premium in the deal. Still, this 
finding is not corroborated when other different measures of investor protection are included in the model. 
The degree of shareholder orientation in the bidder country has a positive effect on the target returns but 
only in model 1 of Table 9. This lack of a consistent significant impact of the bidder shareholder protection on the 
target returns is also documented by Rossi and Volpin (2004). They conclude that bidders from countries with better 
shareholder protection do not pay more for cross-border M&As than bidders from other countries. Overall, our 
                                                 
17 This result does not support the negative spillover by law hypothesis as under this hypothesis we would expect negative or at 
best insignificant bidder returns.   15 
evidence suggests that the corporate governance regime in the target (but not the bidder) country positively affects 
the target shareholders returns. 
As to the control variables, most of our findings are in line with those of other empirical studies on cross-
border M&As (see, e.g. Harris and Ravenscraft, 1991; Dewenter, 1995). In particular, we observe that target returns 
are significantly higher in hostile takeovers and in full takeovers (resulting in the transfer of 100% of control), and 
are significantly lower when equity is used as a means of payment and when corruption in the target country is high.  
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
 
The Impact of Corporate Governance Spillover Effects on the Target Returns 
 
Whereas Table 9 examines the impact of the national regulation on the target returns, we now analyse the 
impact of corporate governance spillover. Panel A of Table 10 reports that the target returns increase with the scope 
of  potential  shareholder  protection  spillover  as  measured  by  the  differences  between  the  bidder  and  target 
shareholder rights indices. When a bidding firm is from a country with higher shareholder protection than the target, 
the bidder (better) corporate governance standard will be imposed - by law in case of a full acquisition - on the 
target firm (the positive spillover by law effect) which leads to significantly higher target announcement returns. 
Similarly, in case of a partial acquisition, the bidder firm may impose its better shareholder protection standards on 
the target (the spillover by control effect) which leads to higher target shareholder returns. This implies that part of 
the synergies in cross-border acquisitions result from corporate governance improvements at the target. As the 
target shareholders anticipate this, they are able to claim part of the expected value improvement given that they are 
sellers in a strong bargaining position.  
Moreover,  when  we  differentiate  between  the  cases  where  the  bidder  is  subject  to  stronger  (weaker) 
shareholder protection than the target (Panel B of Table 10), we find further confirmation of our result. Target 
returns increase when there is a positive spillover effect from the bidder to the target, i.e. when the bidder is from a 
country with a stronger shareholder orientation. These results yield support to our positive spillover by law and 
spillover  by  control  hypotheses.  Interestingly,  the  evidence  does  not  support  the  negative  spillover  by  law 
hypothesis: in takeovers by bidders from countries with poorer standards, the target returns are not significantly 
lower.  
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
 
D.  Additional Analyses  
 
D1. Does a change in the target nationality matter? 
 
Bris and Cabolis (2007a) emphasize that target companies benefit from corporate governance spillovers 
only when the bidder acquires 100% of the target firm’s shares, i.e. when the target firm de facto changes its 
nationality (spillover by law hypothesis). In case of a full acquisition, the target firm becomes a part of the bidding 
firm and hence will have to comply with the corporate governance regulation in the bidder country. To further test 
this hypothesis, we split our sample into full and partial acquisitions and we re-estimate the models from Tables 8   16 
and 10. Table 11 shows that, irrespective of the type of the takeover (full or partial), bidding firms from countries 
with above-median shareholder protection experience significantly higher returns when they acquire target firms 
from  countries  with  below-median  shareholder  protection.  The  evidence  supports  the  spillover  by  control 
hypothesis:  a  well-governed  bidding  firm may  improve  the  governance  at  the  target firm  in  which  it holds  a 
majority stake such that a target firm’s assets may be used more efficiently and create more shareholder value.  
[Insert Table 11 about here] 
 
Table  11  also  unveils another  interesting  result:  bidder  returns  are  also  higher  in  a  partial  acquisition 
involving a bidder from a country with below-median shareholder protection and a target from a country with above 
median shareholder protection. We interpret the positive coefficients as evidence consistent with the bootstrapping 
hypothesis: poorly governed firms acquire well-governed firms to credibly bootstrap themselves to better corporate 
governance standards. They bootstrap the quality of their corporate governance standards by (voluntary) adhering to 
the higher shareholder protection of the target firm. Given that the nationality of the target firm does not change, 
and that part of the equity of the target firm is still held by its (old) shareholders, the bidder may feel pressurized by 
the target minority shareholders or voluntary decide to emulate the high corporate standards in the country of the 
target  firm.  This  is  reflected  in  the  bidder  returns.  The  positive  target  returns  do  not  support  the  alternative 
hypothesis, the negative spillover by law.   
We also perform the analysis of the target returns for the sub-samples of full and partial acquisitions in 
Table 12. We observe that partitioning our sample does not materially change our original results as the positive 
spillover by law hypothesis (full acquisitions) and the spillover by control hypothesis (partial acquisitions) are 
upheld.  Thus,  the  target  returns  increase  with  the  scope  of  the  potential  corporate-governance  improvement 
irrespective of the degree of control change (full versus partial takeovers): acquisitions by bidders with stronger 
shareholder protection create more value than other types of acquisitions irrespective of the takeover type (full or 
partial).  
[Insert Table 12 about here] 
 
D2. The Bidder Returns and the Decision to Participate in a Takeover  
 
In section B, we have discussed the potential endogeneity problem associated with the bidder and target 
decision to participate in cross-border M&As and have corrected for this by using Heckman’s λ. While Heckman’s 
λ allows us to control for the differences in cross-border and domestic acquisitions, this still ignores the fact that 
firms involved in a takeover (be it a domestic or cross-border one) may be different from firms that stayed clear of 
the takeover process. Factors such as financial constraints, growth opportunities, and share price performance (most 
of which are likely to be associated with corporate governance regulation) are likely to be important determinants of 
the bidder decision (not) to participate in a takeover. In other words, we may observe fewer takeovers by bidders 
from countries with weak corporate governance regulation (in terms of both (minority) shareholder and creditor 
protection). To control for this potential bias, we estimate yet another Heckman’s λ. Applying a Probit analysis on   17 
the  sample  of  all  European  public  firms  (with  data  available  in  Amadeus  and  DataStream),  we  estimate  the 
probability that a firm will undertake an acquisition.
18  
We perform two tests of the significance of this censoring problem. First, in the regression analysis of the 
bidder returns, we include the new Heckman’s λ instead of the Heckman’s λ estimated based on the equation that 
predicts a cross-border bidder. We find that the null hypothesis that the new Heckman’s λ is insignificant cannot be 
rejected. This suggests that this type of sample-selection bias is not a significant problem in our sample and hence is 
not likely to cloud our estimation procedure. Second, we also re-estimate our regressions by including both the 
initial (cross-border takeover) Heckman’s λ and the new one (related to the general M&A decision). We find that 
whereas the former is still significant, the new Heckman’s λ remains insignificant.  
 
D3. Means of payment effect of the offer 
 
Starks and Wei (2005) hypothesize that the means of payment has a significant impact on the premiums 
paid in cross-border acquisitions. The argument is the following: when target shareholders accept equity in an all-
equity or mixed offer, they remain involved in the merged firm and will demand additional compensation when the 
bidding firm is from a country with low shareholder protection. Thus, they require a higher premium to make up for 
the increased risk exposure due to the poor governance standards of the bidder (and hence the merged firm if the 
bidder does not voluntarily bootstrap its governance standards). Thus, the takeover premium should be decreasing in 
the quality of the bidder firm. Although our analyses include a variable capturing the means of payment, we re-
estimate our models for sub-samples of all-equity payment/mixed offers, and of all-cash offers. Unlike Starks and 
Wei (2005), we find that our results regarding the spillover by law and the bootstrapping hypotheses do not depend 
on the means of payment.  
 
D4. Further Sensitivity Tests 
 
Our results are also robust to the following alternative specifications: (i) we measure abnormal returns over 
alternative event windows such as [-5, +5] and [-60, +60]; (ii) we employ industry-adjusted characteristics of 
bidding and target firms such as Q-ratio, leverage, size, and cash flow; (iii) we control for both bidder and target 
collateral (the fixed assets) as a proxy for financial takeover synergies and access to debt financing; (iv) we include 
year and industry fixed effects; (v) we control for the bidder toehold in the target company accumulated prior to the 




We demonstrate that differences between the bidder and target corporate governance standards have an 
important impact on the returns from cross-border mergers and acquisitions. To proxy for the quality of corporate 
governance in the countries of the target and the bidder, we have developed with the help of 150 lawyers in 32 
countries time-varying corporate governance indices capturing the changes in corporate governance regulation (soft 
                                                 
18 The regression results are not reported but available from the authors upon request.   18 
law)  over  the  past  15  years.  The  indices  cover  three  dimensions  of  corporate  governance:  shareholder  rights, 
minority shareholder rights, and creditor rights, while also embedding the efficiency of the judicial systems.  
In a full takeover, the corporate governance standards of the bidder may be imposed on the target. When the 
bidder is from a country with stronger shareholder orientation, part of the total synergy value of the takeover may 
result from the fact that the stronger shareholder focus of the acquirer may generate additional returns due to better 
management of the target assets. We call this the positive spillover by law hypothesis. Given that this future value 
creation can be anticipated at the takeover announcement, the abnormal returns will reflect this potential. We expect 
that both the bidder and target firms share the returns from better corporate governance (stronger shareholder rights 
protection) and that their relative bargaining power determines how these returns are shared. Our empirical analysis 
corroborates the positive spillover by law hypothesis: the better the bidder corporate governance standards, the 
higher are the bidder and target takeover announcement returns.  
While the positive spillover by law effect applies to full takeovers, we define the spillover by control 
hypothesis for partial takeovers (whereby a bidder acquires majority control but buys less than 100% of the voting 
rights). In partial takeovers, the bidder may impose its governance standards which may yield positive returns if it is 
from a country that protects shareholder rights better than the target. The bidder may voluntary opt to apply such 
standards or may be pressurized by the minority shareholders of the target firm. Our results confirm the spillover by 
control hypothesis: both the bidder and target returns are higher in a partial acquisition if the bidder is subject to 
stronger shareholder rights protection than the target.  
In full takeovers where the bidder is from a country that protects shareholders less well than the target 
country, the negative spillover by law hypothesis states that the target and bidder anticipated gains will be lower 
given that the poorer corporate governance regime will be imposed on the target. The alternative bootstrapping 
hypothesis is that poor-governance bidders voluntarily bootstrap to the better-governance regime of the target, 
which  yields  a  share  price  increase. Our  evidence supports  the  bootstrapping  hypothesis: the  bidder  abnormal 
returns  are  higher  when  a  bidder  with  weaker  shareholder  orientation  acquires  a  target  with  better  standards. 
Importantly, the effect is only valid for partial acquisitions or, in other words, for deals which still involve some of 
the target shareholders (who did not sell out) and for which the target firm remains listed on the stock exchange in 
the country of the target. The results are robust with respect to several model specifications that control for potential 
endogeneity problems. We conclude that an improvement in corporate governance at the target firm is an important 
source of gains in cross-border M&As. 
Overall,  our  results  suggest  that  cross-border  takeovers  between  bidders  and  targets  with  dissimilar 
corporate  governance  standards  can  generates  synergies  which  are  partially  related  to  corporate  governance 
improvements (especially, those consisting of increases in shareholder rights).  
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Appendix I: Variable Definition 
 
Variable  Definition 
# Domestic Acquisitions / 
# Listed Firms 1 year prior 
Number of domestic acquisitions in the bidder/target country during the year prior to the deal announcement 
divided by the number of listed firms registered in this country. Source: computed from SDC, DataStream 
(Bidder) Creditor Rights 
Improvement 
Indicator equals one if the bidder creditor rights index is below the median index and the target index is above 




Indicator equals one if the bidder minority shareholder protection index is below the median index and the 




Indicator equals one if the bidder shareholder rights index is below the median index and the target index is 
above the median, zero otherwise. Source: Martynova and Renneboog (2007b) and Appendix II/III. 
(Target) Creditor Rights 
Improvement 
Indicator equals one if the bidder creditor rights index is above the median index and the target index is below 




Indicator equals one if the bidder minority shareholder protection index is above the median index and the 




Indicator equals one if the bidder shareholder rights index is above the median index and the target index is 
below the median, zero otherwise. Source: Martynova and Renneboog (2007b) and Appendix II/III. 
1997-1999  Indicator equals one if the bid was initiated in the period between January 1, 1997 and December 31, 1999 (the 
climax of the 5
th takeover wave); and equals zero otherwise.   
2000-2001  Indicator equals one if the bid was initiated in the period between January 1, 2000 and December 31, 2001 (the 
decline of the 5
th takeover wave); and equals zero otherwise.   
Anti-corruption Index  The extent to which one can exercise public power for private gain It quantifies indicators ranging from the 
frequency of “additional payments to get things done” to the effects of corruption on the business environment. 
The index ranges between 0 and 5, with higher values corresponding to the lower level of corruption.  Source: 
The World Bank (http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/) 
CFlow/TA  Ratio of total cash flow (including cash flow from operating, financial, and investment activities) to total assets, 
at  the  year-end  prior  to  the  deal  announcement.  Source:  based  on  SDC  and  Amadeus/Fame/Reach  and 
DataStream. 
Common Border  Indicator equals one if the bidder and target are from countries that have a common border, and equals zero 
otherwise. 
Creditor rights index  The value of the Creditor rights index (defined in Appendix III) multiplied by the Rule of Law index. Source: 
Martynova and Renneboog (2007b) and Appendix II/III. 
Diff (Bidder-Target) 
Creditor rights index 
Variable equals the difference between the bidder and the target Creditor rights indices. Source: Martynova and 




The difference between the bidder and the target Minority shareholder protection indices. Source: Martynova 
and Renneboog (2007b) and Appendix II/III. 
Diff (Bidder-Target) 
Shareholder rights index 
The difference between the bidder and the target Shareholder rights indices. Source: Martynova and Renneboog 
(2007b) and Appendix II/III. 
Diversification  Indicator equals one if the bidder and target operate in different industries (their primary 2-digit SIC codes are 
not equal), and equals zero otherwise. Source: based on SDC and Amadeus/Fame/Reach 
Equity payment  Indicator equals one if the acquisition is fully paid with equity, and equals zero otherwise. 
Source: based on SDC, LexisNexis, Factiva, and Financial Times 
Hostile bid  Indicator equals one if the initial takeover offer is met by a negative reaction by the management of the target 
firm or if a competing bid is made. Source: based on SDC, LexisNexis, Factiva, and Financial Times  
Leverage  Ratio of total (long-term and short-term) debt to total assets at the year-end prior to the deal announcement. 
Source: based on Amadeus/Fame/Reach and DataStream 
M&A of 100%  Indicator equals one if the bidder fully acquires the target and hence holds 100% of the share capital after the 




Variable that takes the value of the Minority shareholder protection index (defined in Appendix III) multiplied 
by the Rule of Law index. Source: Martynova and Renneboog (2007b) and Appendix II/III. 
Public target  Indicator  equals one if the target firm was  a stand-alone firm  listed on a European stock  exchange  at the 
moment of the bid announcement, and is zero otherwise. Source: based on SDC and Amadeus/Fame/Reach   22 
Variable  Definition 
Q-ratio  Ratio of market value of equity (ordinary and preferred) plus book value of total (long-term and short-term) 
debt over the sum of book value of equity and book value of total debt. The market value of equity is taken 60 
days prior to deal announcement, book value of equity and debt are at year-end prior to deal announcement. 
Source: based on Amadeus/Fame/Reach and DataStream 
Relative size  The ratio of the transaction value over the sum of the transaction value plus the bidder market value of equity 
and book value of total (long-term and short-term) debt. If the transaction value is undisclosed, we use the book 
value of the target firm’s assets one year prior to the bid multiplied by the percentage of share capital acquired. 
Source: based on SDC, LexisNexis, Factiva, and Financial Times and Amadeus/Fame/Reach and DataStream 
Rule of Law index  The Rule of Law index measures the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of 
society;  these  also  include  the  effectiveness  and  predictability  of  the  judiciary  and  the  enforceability  of 
contracts. The index ranges between 0 and 5, with higher values corresponding to the better quality of law 
enforcement.  Source: The World Bank (http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/). 
Run-up             Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of the bidder/target over the window [-60, -2] preceding the day of the 
deal  announcement.  Abnormal  returns  are  computed  with  the  market  model  adjusted  for  thin-trading  and 
reversion to the mean. The market model’s parameters are estimated over the period of 300 to 60 days before 
the M&A announcement; the market index is the MSCI Europe index. Source: based on DataStream 
Same Industry  Indicator equals one if the bidder and target operate in same industries (their primary 2-digit SIC codes are the 
same), and equals zero otherwise. Source: based on SDC and Amadeus/Fame/Reach 
Same Language group  Indicator equals one if at least one official language of the target country belongs the same language group 
(Romance languages, Germanic (excluding English), Slavic, English) as that of the one of the official languages 
of the bidder country, and equals zero otherwise. Source: based on SDC 
Shareholder rights index  The value of the Shareholder rights index (defined in Appendix III) multiplied by the Rule of Law index. 
Source: Martynova and Renneboog (2007b) and Appendix II/III. 
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Appendix II. The names of the legal experts who contributed to the corporate governance database :  
 
Austria:  Prof.  Susanne  Kalls  (University  of  Klagenfurt),  Prof.  Christian  Nowotny  and  Mr.  Stefan  Fida  (Vienna  University  of  Economics  and  Business 
Administration); 
Belgium: Prof. Eddy Wymeersch (University of Ghent, Chairman of the Commission for Finance, Banking and Assurance), Prof. Christoph Van der Elst 
(University of Ghent); 
Bulgaria: Dr. Plamen Tchipev (Institute of Economics, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences), Ms. Tania Bouzeva (ALIENA Consult Ltd., Sofia), Dr. Ivaylo Nikolov 
(Centre for Economic Development, Sofia); 
Croatia: Dr. Domagoj Racic and Mr. Josip Stajfer (The Institute of Economics, Zagreb), Mr. Andrej Galogaža (Zagreb Stock Exchange), Prof. Drago Čengić 
(IVO PILAR Institute of Social Sciences), Prof. Edita Culinovic-Herc (University of Rijeka); 
Cyprus: Mr. Marios Clerides (Chairman) and Ms. Christiana Vovidou (Cyprus Securities and Exchange Commission); 
Czech Republic: Prof. Lubos Tichy, Mr. Martin Abraham, and Mr. Rostislav Pekar (Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, Cousellors at Law), Dr. Petr Kotáb and Prof. 
Milan Bakes (Charles University of Prague), Dr. Stanislav Myslil (Čermák Hořejš Myslil a spol, Lawyers and Patent Attorneys), Dr. Jan Bárta (Institute of 
State and Law, The Academy of Science of Czech Republic), Ms. Jana Klirova  (Corporate Governance Consulting, Prague); 
Denmark: Prof. Jesper Lau Hansen and Prof. Ulrik Rammeskow Bang-Pedersen (University of Copenhagen);  
Estonia: Prof. Andres Vutt  (University of Tartu), Mr. Toomas Luhaaar, Mr. Peeter Lepik, and Ms Katri Paas (Law Office of Lepik & Luhaäär); 
Finland: Prof. Matti J. Sillanpää (Turku School of Economics and Business Administration), Mr. Ingalill Aspholm  (Rahoitustarkastus/Financial Supervision 
Authority), Ms Ari-Pekka Saanio  (Borenius & Kemppinen, Attorneys at Law, Helsinki), Ms Johan Aalto (Hannes Snellman, Attorneys at Law; Helsinki); 
France: Prof. Alain Couret  (Université Paris I- Panthéon-Sorbonne), Ms. Joëlle Simon (MEDEF - French Business Confederation), Prof. Benoit Le Bars (MC 
Université de Cergy-Pontoise), Prof. Alain Pietrancosta (Universities of Tours and Paris I- Panthéon-Sorbonne), Prof. Viviane de Beaufort (ESSEC-MBA), 
Prof. Gerard Charreaux (Université de Bourgogne Pôle d'économie et de gestion); 
Germany: Prof. Peter O. Muelbert (University of Mainz), Prof. Klaus Hopt and Dr. Alexander Hellgardt (Max Planck Institute for Foreign Private and Private 
International Law),  Prof. Theodor Baums and Mr. Tobias Pohl (Johann Wolfgang Goethe University, Frankfurt/Main); 
Greece: Prof.  Loukas Spanos (Centre of Financial Studies,  University of Athens),  Dr. Harilaos  Mertzanis (Hellenic Capital Market Commission),  Prof. 
Georgios D. Sotiropoulos (University of Athens); 
Hungary: Dr.Tamás Sándor (Sándor Bihary Szegedi Szent-Ivány Advocats), Dr. Andras Szecskay and Dr. Orsolya Görgényi (Szecskay Law Firm - Moquet 
Borde & Associés), Prof. Adam Boóc and Prof. Anna Halustyik (Corvinus University of Budapest); 
Iceland: Mr. Gunnar Sturluson and Mr. Olafur Arinbjorn Sigurdsson (LOGOS legal services), Dr. Aðalsteinn E. Jónasson  (Straumur Investment Bank and 
Reykjavik University), Mr. David Sch. Thorssteinsson (Iceland Chamber of Commerce); 
Ireland Republic: Dr. Blanaid Clarke (University College Dublin), Ms. Kelley Smith (Irish Law Library, Barrister); 
Italy: Prof. Guido Ferrarini and Mr. Andrea Zanoni (University of Genoa), Dr. Magda Bianco and Dr. Alessio Pacces (Banca d'Italia), Prof. Luca Enriques 
(Università di Bologna); 
Latvia: Prof. Kalvis Torgans and Dr. Pauls Karnups (University of Latvia), Mr. Uldis Cerps (Riga Stock Exchange); 
Lithuania: Mr. Virgilijus Poderys (Chairman) and Ms. Egle Surpliene (The Securities Commission of Lithuania), Mr. Rolandas Valiūnas, Dr. Jaunius Gumbis, 
and Dr. Dovilė Burgienė (Lideika, Petrauskas, Valiūnas ir partneriai), Dr. Paulius Cerka (Vytautas Magnus University), Mr. Tomas Bagdanskis (Tomas 
Bagdanskis, Attorney at Law); 
Luxembourg: Mr. Jacques Loesch (Linklaters Loesch Law Firm), Mr. Daniel Dax (Luxembourg Stock Exchange); 
Netherlands: Prof. Jaap Winter (De Brauw Blackstone Westbroek, High Level Group of Company Law Experts European Commission Office (Chairman), 
University of Amsterdam), Mr. Marcel van de Vorst and Mr. Gijs van Leeuwen (Norton Rose Advocaten & Solicitors), Mr. Johan Kleyn and Dr. Barbara 
Bier (Allen & Overy LLP), Dr. Pieter Ariens Kappers (Boekel De Nerée), Prof. A.F. Verdam (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam), Prof. Mr. C. A. Schwarz 
(Maastricht University); 
Norway: Prof. Kristin Normann Aarum (Oslo University), Prof. Tore Brathen (University of Tromsø), Prof. Jan Andersson (University of Bergen); 
Poland: Prof. Stanisław Sołtysiński and Dr. Andrzej W. Kawecki (The law firm of Sołtysiński Kawecki & Szlęzak), Mr. Igor Bakowski (Gotshal & Manges, 
Chajec, Don-Siemion & Żyto Sp.k.), Dr. Piotr Tamowicz, Mr. Maciej Dzierżanowski, and Mr. Michał Przybyłowski (The Gdańsk Institute for Market 
Economics), Ms. Anna Miernika-Szulc  (Warsaw Stock Exchange); 
Portugal: Mr. Victor Mendes (CMVM – Comissão do Mercado de Valores Mobiliários), Mr. Carlos Ferreira Alves (CEMPRE, Faculdade de Economia, 
Universidade do Porto), Prof. Manuel Pereira Barrocas (Barrocas Sarmento Rocha - Sociedade de Advogados), Dr. Jorge de Brito Pereira (PLMJ - A.M. 
Pereira, Sragga Leal, Oliveira Martins, J dice e Associados - Sociedade de Advogados), Dr. Manuel Costa Salema, Dr. Carlos Aguiar, and Mr. Pedro Pinto 
(Law firm Carlos Aguiar P Pinto & Associados), Mr. Antonio Alfaia de Carvalho (Lebre Sá Carvalho & Associados); 
Romania: Mr. Gelu Goran  (Salans, Bucharest office), Dr. Sorin David (Law firm David & Baias SCPA), Ms. Adriana I. Gaspar (Nestor Nestor Diculescu 
Kingston Petersen, Attorneys & Counselors), Mr. Catalin Baiculescu and Dr. Horatiu Dumitru (Musat & Associates, Attorneys at Law), Ms. Catalina 
Grigorescu (Haarmann Hemmelrath Law Firm); 
Slovak Republic: Dr. Jozef Makuch (Chairman) and Dr. Stanislav Škurla (Financial Market Authority, Slovak Republic), Dr. Frantisek Okruhlica (Slovak 
Governance Institute); 
Slovenia: Prof. Janez Prasnikar and Dr. Aleksandra Gregoric (University of Ljubljana), Prof. Miha Juhart, Mr. Klemen Podobnik, and Ms. Ana Vlahek 
(Securities Market Agency); 
Spain: Prof. Candido Paz-Ares (Universidad Autonoma de Madrid), Prof. Marisa Aparicio (Universidad Autonoma de Madrid and Universidad Pontificia 
Comillas de Madrid), Prof. Guillermo Guerra (Universidad Rey Juan Carlos); 
Sweden:  Prof.  Per  Samuelsson  and  Prof.  Gerard  Muller  (School  of  Economics  and  Management  at  Lund  University),  Prof.  Rolf  Dotevall  (Göteborg 
University), Dr. Catarina af Sandeberg, and Prof. Annina Persson (Stockholm University), Prof. Björn Kristiansson (Linklaters Sweden); 
Switzerland: Dr. Urs P. Gnos (Walder Wyss & Partners), Prof. Gerard Hertig (Swiss Federal Institute of Technology - ETH Zurich), Dr. Michel Haymann 
(Haymann & Baldi), Prof. Wolfgang Drobetz (University of Basel – WWZ), Prof. Karl Hofstetter (Universität Zürich), Prof. Peter Nobel and Mr. Marcel 
Würmli (Universität St. Gallen); 
UK: Prof. Antony Dnes (Bournemouth University), Prof. Dan Prentice and Ms. Jenny Payne (Oxford University), Prof. Brian R Cheffins, Mr. Richard Charles 
Nolan, and Mr. John Armour (University of Cambridge), Prof. Paul Davies (London School of Economics), Mr. Gerard N. Cranley, Ms. Holly Gregory, and 
Ms. Ira Millstein (Weil, Gotshal & Manges), Ms. Eva Lomnicka (University of London);   24 
Appendix III. Design of corporate governance standards indices 
 
The table shows how specific regulations are quantified to construct three corporate governance standards indices: the shareholder 




1.  The  shareholder  rights  index  reflects  the  shareholders’  ability  to  mitigate  managerial  opportunistic  behaviour.  The  index  is 
constructed by combining the following 4 sub-indices: 
 
1.1 The appointment rights sub-index is based on the rules to appoint and replace executive and non-executive directors. It measures 
the degree of alignment of the interests of management and shareholders. The regulatory provisions are quantified as follows: 
￿  Employee representation: 0 if required, 2 if not.  
￿  Nomination to the board by shareholders: 2 if required, 0 if not. 
￿  Tenure on the board: 0 if more than 4 years, 1 if 4 years, 2 if less then 4 years  
￿  Cross-shareholdings:  
o  Cross-shareholdings between 2 independent companies: 1 if regulated, 0 if not. 
o  Maximum shareholding of a subsidiary in its parent company: 1 if regulated, 0 if not 
￿  Election rules:  
o  Proxy voting by mail: 2 if allowed, 0 if not 
o  Requirement to Deposit/Register shares prior to a general meeting: 
￿  Bearer shares: 0 if deposit is required, 1 if only registration of shares is required, 2 if none is required 
￿  Nominal shares: 0 if deposit is required, 2 if deposit requirement is forbidden 
 
1.2 The decision rights sub-index captures the shareholders’ ability to mitigate managerial discretion. The decision rights index cover 
regulatory provisions that mandate direct shareholder decision-making. The regulatory provisions are quantified as follows: 
￿  Shareholders approval of anti-takeover measures: 2 if required, 0 if not. 
￿  Shareholders approval of preemption rights: 2 if required, 0 if not. 
￿  Percentage needed to call for extraordinary meeting: 0 if no rule or more than 20%, 1 if 20% or less but more than 5%, 2 if 5% 
and less. 
￿  Voting caps: 0 if allowed, 2 if not. 
 
1.3 The trusteeship sub-index measures the efficiency of the board of directors in monitoring the actions of CEOs. The following 
regulatory provisions are quantified as follows: 
￿  Board independence:  
o  2 if CEO cannot be the chairman of the board of directors (in 1-tier board structure), 0 otherwise 
o  2 if the overlap between management and supervisory board is forbidden (in 2-tier board structure), 0 otherwise 
￿  Employee representation: 0 if required, 2 if not.  
￿  Separate board of auditors: 1 if required, 0 otherwise 
 
1.4 The transparency sub-index is based on the quality of information about company, its ownership structure, and management 
available to investors 
￿  Requirement to disclose managerial compensation: 0 if not required, 1 if required on aggregate basis, 2 if required on individual 
basis. 
￿  Requirement to disclose any transactions between management and company: 2 if required, 0 if not 
￿  Frequency of financial reports: 0 if once per year, 1 if twice per year, 2 if more than twice per year 
￿  Comply or explain rule: 1 if the requirement is present, 0 otherwise 
 
The higher each index, the better is the protection of the shareholders. 
 
2. The minority shareholders protection index is based on the regulatory provisions aimed at increasing the relative power of the 
minority shareholders in a context of strong majority shareholders. The index is constructed by combining the following 4 sub-indices: 
 
2.1 Minority shareholders appointment rights sub-index is based on the appointment rights that can be used to protect minority 
shareholders. These include rights to reserve seats on the board of directors for minority shareholders or to limit voting power of large 
shareholders. The regulatory provisions are quantified as follows: 
￿  Minority representation on the board: 2 if required, 0 otherwise.  
￿  Voting caps limiting power of large shareholders: 1 if voting caps are allowed, 0 if not. 
￿  One-share-one-vote rule: 0 if both multiple voting rights and non-voting shares are allowed; 1 if one of the two is allowed; 2 if 
none is allowed. 
 
2.2 Minority shareholders decision rights sub-index captures the ability of minority shareholders to affect fundamental corporate   25 
transactions that require a shareholder vote. The regulatory provisions are quantified as follows: 
￿  Supermajority requirement for approval of major company’s decisions: 0 if 50% or less; 1 if more then 50% but less then 75%; 2 
if 75% or more 
￿  Percentage needed to call for extraordinary meeting: 0 if the rule is not present or required percentage is 20% or more; 1 if the 
required percentage is between 20 and 5%; 2 if the percentage is 5% or less. 
 
2.3 The minority shareholders trusteeship rights sub-index indicates the extent to which the board of directors serves as a trustee for 
minority  shareholder,  i.e.  the  directors  are  independent  from  the  firm’s  controlling  shareholders.  The  regulatory  provisions  are 
quantified as follows: 
￿  Nomination to the board by shareholders: 2 if shareholders voting to elect non-executive directors is not required (2-tier 
boards); 0 if required or 1-tier board 
￿  Board independence: 2 if CEO cannot be the chairman of the board of directors (in 1-tier board structure) or if the overlap 
between management and supervisory board is forbidden (in 2-tier board structure), 0 otherwise 
 
2.4 The minority shareholders affiliation rights sub-index groups the remaining regulatory provisions aimed at protecting minority 
shareholders: the principle of equal treatment (or shared returns) and rights for entry and exit on fair terms. The regulatory provisions 
are quantified as follows: 
￿  Equal treatment rule: 2 if required, 0 if not, 
￿  Mandatory disclosure of large ownership stakes: 0 if disclosure is not required or the minimum percent is 25% or more; 1 if 10% 
or more (less then 25%); 2 if 5% or more (less then 10%); 3 if less then 5%. 
￿  Mandatory bid rule: 0 if not required; 1 if 50% or control; 2 if between 50 and 30%; 3 if 30% or less. 
￿  Sell-out rule: The squeeze-out rule is used as a proxy for the sell-out rule, (assumption: sell-out is always in place if squeeze-out 
is adopted, with the same terms as squeeze-out): 0 if no squeeze-out; 1 if squeeze-out at 95% or more; 2 if squeeze-out at 90% or 
less. 
￿  Minority claim: 0 if no; 1 if 10% or more; 2 if 5% or more; 3 if less then 5%. 
￿  Break-through rule: 1 if required; 0 if not, 
 
The higher each index, the better is the protection of the minority shareholders. 
 
3. The creditor rights index is based on regulatory provisions that allow creditors to force repayment more easily, take possession of 
collateral, or gain control over firm in financial distress. The regulatory provisions are quantified as follows: 
 
￿  Debtor-oriented versus Creditor-oriented code: 1 if no reorganization option (liquidation only); 0 if reorganization + liquidation 
option; 
￿  Automatic stay on the assets: 1 if no automatic stay is obliged in reorganization (if debt-orient code) or liquidation procedure (if 
liquidation code); 0 otherwise; 
￿  Secured creditors are ranked first: 1 if secured creditors are ranked first in the liquidation procedure;  0 if  government and 
employees are ranked first; 
￿  Creditor approval of bankruptcy: 1 if creditor approval is required to initiate reorganization procedure (if debtor-oriented code) or 
liquidation procedure (if liquidation code); 0 otherwise; 
￿  Appointment of official to manage reorganization/liquidation procedure: 1 if it is required by law in a reorganization procedure 
(if debtor-oriented code) or a liquidation procedure (if liquidation code); 0 otherwise. 
 
The higher the index, the better is the protection of the creditors 
   26 
Table 1. Sample distribution by country of bidding and target company in domestic and cross-border M&As.  
 
The diagonal elements report the number of domestic acquisitions in a particular country. Off-diagonal elements report the number of cross-border bids involving bidding and 
target companies from the two corresponding countries. Total* NUM counts total the cross-border M&As (excluding domestic deals); Total* % shows the percentage of cross-
border  M&As  involving  firms  from  one  country  in  the  total  number  of  cross-border  M&As.  The  following  country  codes  are  used:  AUS=Austria,  BEL=Belgium, 
BUL=Bulgaria,  CRO=Croatia,  CYP=Cyprus,  CZR=Czech  Republic,  DEN=Denmark,  EST=Estonia,  FIN=Finland,  FRA=France,  GER=Germany,  GRE=Greece, 
HUN=Hungary,  IRE=Republic  of  Ireland,  ITA=Italy,  LAT=Latvia,  LIT=Lithuania,  LUX=Luxembourg,  NL=Netherlands,  NOR=Norway,  POL=Poland,  POR=Portugal, 
ROM=Romania, RUS=Russia, SLO=Slovenia, ESP=Spain, SWE=Sweden, SWZ=Switzerland, UK= United Kingdom.    27 
 
    TARGET FIRMS 
Total* 
cross-border 
    AUS  BEL  BUL  CRO  CYP  CZR  DEN  EST  FIN  FRA  GER  GRE  HUN  IRE  ITA  LAT  LIT  LUX  NL  NOR  POL  POR  ROM  RUS  SLO  ESP  SWE  SWZ  UK  NUM  % 
AUS  11  -  -  2  -  2  1  -  -  -  12  -  2  -  1  -  -  -  1  -  4  -  3  -  1  -  -  2  -  31  4.2% 
BEL  -  23  -  -  -  1  -  -  -  14  4  -  -  -  1  -  -  -  2  1  1  1  1  1  -  -  3  1  3  34  4.6% 
BUL  -  -  0  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
CRO  -  -  -  0  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  1  1  0.1% 
CYP  -  -  -  -  3  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  1  -  -  -  -  -  -  1  -  -  2  0.3% 
CZR  -  -  -  -  -  9  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  1  -  -  -  -  -  -  1  0.1% 
DEN  1  -  -  1  -  -  30  1  3  4  2  -  -  -  3  -  2  -  1  4  1  -  -  -  -  -  3  -  6  32  4.3% 
EST  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  0  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
FIN  1  -  -  -  -  -  4  6  53  -  3  -  -  -  1  3  1  -  1  2  1  -  1  1  -  -  6  -  1  32  4.3% 
FRA  3  2  -  -  -  7  -  -  1  219  22  1  -  -  13  -  -  1  5  1  6  1  2  1  2  8  3  5  26  110  14.9% 
GER  9  4  -  -  -  4  -  -  1  10  174  -  1  1  9  -  -  1  7  1  5  2  2  2  -  2  5  10  13  89  12.1% 
GRE  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  1  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
HUN  -  -  -  2  -  -  -  -  1  -  1  -  4  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  1  -  -  -  -  -  5  0.7% 
IRE  -  1  -  -  -  -  2  -  1  -  -  -  -  11  -  -  -  -  2  -  1  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  19  26  3.5% 
ITA  -  -  -  -  -  1  -  -  -  7  5  -  -  -  39  -  2  1  -  1  1  1  -  -  -  5  1  -  3  28  3.8% 
LAT  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  1  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  0  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  1  0.1% 
LIT  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  1  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
LUX  -  1  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  1  3  -  -  1  -  -  -  0  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  1  7  1.0% 
NL  -  -  -  -  -  1  1  -  -  7  2  -  -  -  2  -  -  1  2  1  3  -  -  1  -  1  -  1  6  27  1.3% 
NOR  -  -  -  -  -  -  3  2  2  2  4  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  58  2  -  -  -  -  -  13  -  4  32  4.3% 
POL  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  22  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
POR  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  1  -  -  -  1  -  -  -  1  0.1% 
ROM  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  2  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
RUS  1  -  1  -  -  -  -  1  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  10  -  -  -  -  -  3  0.4% 
SLO  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  0  -  -  -  -  -  - 
ESP  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  1  1  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  1  -  3  1  -  -  -  46  -  1  1  9  1.2% 
SWE  1  1  1  -  -  3  6  2  8  5  5  2  -  -  2  1  1  -  4  16  4  1  -  1  1  -  102  2  2  69  9.4% 















UK  2  5  -  1  -  5  4  -  3  31  20  -  -  14  8  -  -  1  18  7  5  2  1  1  -  14  12  5  838  159  21.5% 





















%  2.7%  1.9%  0.3%  0.8%  -  3.4%  2.9%  1.8%  2.7%  12.0%  12.2%  0.4%  0.4%  2.2%  6.0%  0.5% 0.8%  0.7%  6.1%  5.0%  5.0%  1.5%  1.5%  1.4%  0.5%  4.5%  6.5%  3.7%  12.7%  -  100%   28 
Table 2. Cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) to bidding and target firms in cross-border and domestic 
M&As.  
 
Panel A reports the average values of the CARs for bidding and target firms in cross-border and domestic acquisitions conducted in 
Continental Europe and the UK. The CAARs are reported in percentages. Panel B reports the CAARs for bidding and target firms in 
cross-border and domestic acquisitions classified by the legal origin of the bidder and target countries. Abnormal returns are computed 
as the difference between the realized and market model benchmark returns. For each firm, we calculate daily benchmark returns using 
MSCI-Europe index returns and the market model parameters are estimated over 240 days starting 300 days prior to the acquisition 
announcement. The t-statistics from the non-parametric test (Corrado, 1989) is reported to assess the significance of the CAARs. a, b, 
and c stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Nobs stands for the number of observations. 
 






  Mean Value   t-stat   [Nobs]  Mean Value  t-stat   [Nobs]  Mean Value  t-stat 
 
Panel A. Takeover Announcement Effect 
The BIDDER CAARs: 
[-1; +1]  0.47
 b  2.25     [653]  0.83
 a  3.95    [1456]  -0.36
 b  -2.17 
[-5, +5]  0.85
 c  1.92     [653]  0.76
 a  2.56    [1456]                      0.09  1.15 
[-60; +60]  -3.63
 c  -1.80    [653]  -2.49
 c  -1.80    [1456]  -1.14
 a  -3.40 
 
The TARGET CAARs: 
[-1; +1]  12.55
 a  5.24     [296]  11.52
 a     7.42     [764]  1.02
 a  -2.65 
[-5, +5]  15.61
 a  16.15   [296]  12.17
 a    2.60      [764]  3.44
 a  -3.54 
[-60; +60]  26.84
 a  12.04   [296]  24.99
 a  10.22    [764]  1.85
 a  -3.53 
 
Panel B. Takeover Announcement Effect by Legal Origin 
 
The BIDDER CAARs [-1, +1] by legal origin of the bidder country: 
English legal origin            0.36  1.63     [173]  0.50
 a  2.69      [744]                    -0.14  -1.30 
French legal origin  0.39
 c  1.88     [181]  0.91
 b  2.32      [279]  -0.52
 b  -2.18 
German legal origin  0.66
 b  2.08     [137]  0.59
 b  2.44      [184]                      0.07  0.61 
Scandinavian legal origin  0.67
 b  2.15     [149]  2.29
 a  3.17      [206]  -1.62
 a  -3.44 
EU2004 Accession countries  -1.25
 b  -2.03        [6]              0.12  0.56        [35]  -1.37
 a  -2.86 
EU2007 Accession countries,  
      Croatia, and Russia 
        -1.60  -0.23        [4]             -0.51  -0.15         [8]                    -1.09  -0.55 
 
The TARGET CAARs [-1, +1] by legal origin of the target country: 
English legal origin  19.42
 a  7.52       [57]  17.64
 a  14.00      [306]  1.78
 b  2.44 
French legal origin  7.12
 a  3.80       [52]  2.82
 a  3.18      [118]  4.30
 a  3.19 
German legal origin  7.06
 a  3.46       [33]  4.42
 a  3.17        [48]  2.64
 a  2.53 
Scandinavian legal origin  17.32
 a  7.95       [38]  14.77
 a  7.12        [76]  2.55
 a  2.72 
EU 2004 Accession countries            1.52  1.53       [15]  3.67
 a  2.74        [11]                    -2.15  -1.62 
EU 2007 Accession countries,  
      Croatia, and Russia 
        -0.18   -0.12         [8]            -6.36  -0.78          [5]  6.18
 a  3.11 
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Table 3. Corporate Governance Regulation Indices. 
 
Panel A reports the mean values of the corporate governance indices by legal origin and for every fifth year over the period 1990-
2005. All indices are adjusted for the degree of law enforcement by country. N is the number of countries of a specific legal origin. 
Panel B reports the mean values of the indices for bidder and target countries by domestic and cross-border M&As. a, b and c stand for 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 

















Croatia, and Russia 
  N=2  N=8  N=3  N=4  N=9  N=4 
 
PANEL A. Corporate Governance Indices by Legal Origin and by year 
 
SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS INDEX: 
1990  4.79  3.33  2.93  3.34  1.72  1.62 
1995  5.21  3.39  3.21  3.55  2.23  1.72 
2000  5.91  3.87  4.28  3.97  2.65  2.04 
2005  6.13  4.57  4.66  4.18  3.34  2.86 
MINORITY SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION INDEX: 
1990  4.25  2.69  3.14  3.21  1.51  0.68 
1995  4.58  2.89  3.57  3.38  2.13  1.18 
2000  5.20  3.37  4.52  3.60  2.78  1.96 
2005  5.05  3.42  4.64  3.63  3.54  2.15 
CREDITOR RIGHTS INDEX: 
1990  3.40  4.42  5.92  6.67  1.18  1.22 
1995  3.40  4.43  5.92  5.33  3.51  2.27 
2000  3.51  3.89  4.29  4.07  3.82  2.33 
2005  3.41  3.48  4.11  4.03  4.10  2.61 
 
PANEL B. Corporate Governance Indices by the Bidder/Target Country in Cross-border and Domestic M&As 
       
  Cross-Border M&As  Domestic M&As  Diff. Cross-Border – Domestic 
  Mean Value  t-stat  Mean Value  t-stat  Mean Value  t-stat 
 
SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS INDEX: 
Bidder Country  4.37    5.11    -0.74
 a  -3.22 
Target Country  3.74    5.11    -1.37
 a  -2.84 
Diff. Bidder - Target  0.63
 a  3.16  -  -  -  - 
MINORITY SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION INDEX: 
Bidder Country  4.06    4.41    -0.35
 a  -2.65 
Target Country  3.74    4.41    -0.67
 a  -3.11 
Diff. Bidder - Target  0.32
 b  2.31  -  -  -  - 
CREDITOR RIGHTS INDEX: 
Bidder Country  3.71    3.43    0.28  1.62 
Target Country  3.72    3.43    0.29  1.61 
Diff. Bidder - Target  -0.01  -0.04  -  -  -  - 
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Table 4. Correlation matrix 
 
a, b and c stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. P-values testing the difference from zero are given between brackets.  
 
  (Bidder) 
CAR [-1, +1] 
(Target) 











































                       






















(Target) CAR [-1, +1]  0.023 
(.814) 





















                       

































































































































































































Public Target  -0.035 
(.368) 





















































































































































































(.562)   32 
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Table 6. Heckman sample selection equations for bidding and target firms in cross-border M&As 
 
This table shows the selection equations of sample selection models for the bidding and target firms. The selection equations model 
the probability that a bidder (target) firm participates in a cross-border (rather than domestic) acquisition. The depended variable 
equals one if the bidder (target) firm participates in a cross-border takeover, and zero if in a domestic takeover. The definitions of the 
included variables are given in Appendix I.  a, b and c stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
  Probability of a BIDDING 
company  acquiring a 
foreign firm (vs. domestic firm) 
 
Probability of a TARGET  
company being acquired by  
a foreign firm (vs. a domestic firm) 
 
  Coeff.  Pr > ChiSq  Coeff.  Pr > ChiSq 
         
Corporate Governance in the Firm Country: 
Shareholder Rights Index  -0.3123
 a  .000  -0.2149
 c  .092 
Minority Shareholder Protection Index  0.3945
 a  .009  -0.1311  .596 
Creditor Rights Index  0.2804
 a  .000  0.2962
 a  .000 
         
Firm Characteristics:         
Q-ratio  0.0229
 b  .022  0.0398  .174 
Leverage  -0.2117  .590  -0.4936  .346 
Size (log TA)  0.2159
 a  .000  0.1949
 a  .000 
Cash Flow/TA  0.5508  .362  0.2502  .770 
         
Deal Characteristics:         
Public Target  -0.4561
 b  .032  -   
Same Industry  0.0438  .720  -0.0274  .875 
1997-1999  0.2326  .114  0.5145
 b  .019 
2000-2001  0.2987
 b  .049  0.5936
 b  .011 
         
Characteristics of the Firm’s Country:         
Anti-Corruption Index  -0.1045  .418  0.3511
 a  .007 
Log GNP per capita  -0.3639  .522  0.2862  .284 
GDP growth  -0.1593
 c  .078  0.2707
 b  .012 
# Domestic Acquisitions / # Listed Firms 1 year prior  -0.0267  .218  -0.0400  .560 
         
Intercept  -2.9004
 a  .000  -2.1785
 a  .003 
         
Number of obs.  2271    760   
Pseudo-R
2  21.15%    27.08%   
   34 
Table 7. The impact of corporate governance regulation on the bidder CARs in cross-border M&As 
 
This table reports the results of the OLS regression of the bidder CARs for the sample of cross-border takeovers. The dependent 
variable is the bidder CARs [-1, +1]. Variable definitions are given in Appendix I. Seven different specifications are estimated. A 
Heckman sample selection is applied to correct for potential biases due to the bidder’s endogenous choice of participating in a cross-
border (rather than domestic) takeover. For each variable we list the coefficient and the heteroskedasticity-consistent p-value. a/ b/ c 
stand for statistical significance at the 1%/ 5%/ 10%, respectively. 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Corporate Governance Regulation Effect: 







(.156)       





(.810)    0.0020 
(.753)     





      0.0006 
(.830)   







(.314)       






(.216)    -0.0030 
(.118)     
(Target) Creditor Rights Index  0.0004 
(.796) 
0.0014 
(.551)        0.0019 
(.408)   
Bidder and Target Firms’ characteristics: 















































































































































































Bidder and Target Country characteristics: 
Same Language Group 




































(Bidder) log GNP per capita 












Difference (Bidder-Target) log GNP per capita 












(Target) Anti-Corruption Index 















































               
Number of obs.  641  641  641  641  641  641  641 
Adjusted-R
2  3.40%  5.33%  4.67%  5.55%  4.91%  4.85%  4.80%   35 
Table 8. The impact of the corporate governance spillover effects on the bidder CARs in cross-border M&As 
 
This table reports the results of the OLS regression of the bidder CARs for the sample of cross-border takeovers. The dependent 
variable is the bidder CARs [-1, +1]. Variable definitions are given in Appendix I. Six different specifications are estimated. A 
Heckman sample selection is applied to correct for potential biases due to the bidder endogenous choice of participating in a cross-
border (rather than domestic) takeover or not. We do not report the parameter estimates of the control variables, as they are similar to 
those reported in Table 7. The indicator ‘Yes’ denotes that a particular control variable is included in the regression and ‘No’ that it is 
not. Panel A reports the regression estimates of the differences-approach while Panel B reports the estimates of the indicator-variable 
approach.  For  each  variable  we  list  the  coefficient  and  the  heteroskedasticity-consistent  p-value.  a/  b/  c  stand  for  statistical 
significance at 1%/ 5%/ 10%, respectively. The number of observations in each regression is 641. 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)   
PANEL A. DIFFERENCES-APPROACH 
Corporate Governance Regulation Effect: 







(.231)       





(.852)    0.0020 
(.753)     





      0.0025 
(.512) 
 
Corporate Governance Spillover Effect 







(.914)       





(.555)    0.0040 
(.381)     
Diff (Bidder – Target) Creditor Rights Index  -0.0004 
(.796) 
-0.0014 
(.551)        -0.0019 
(.409) 
 
Characteristics of the bidder and target, the M&A deal, and the 
bidder and target countries 
No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes   
Intercept  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes   
Heckman λ (Mill’s ratio)  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes   
Adjusted-R
2  1.68%  4.82%  4.67%  4.55%  3.91%  3.85%   
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)   
PANEL B. INDICATOR-VARIABLE APPROACH 
Corporate Governance Regulation Effect: 








     






  0.0016 
(.783) 
   






    0.0017 
(.624) 
 
Positive Spillover by Law/ Spillover by Control hypotheses (Spillover form Bidder to Target): 














     








  0.0055 
(.566) 
   






      -0.0017 
(.886) 
 
 Bootstrapping hypothesis (Spillover from Target to Bidder): 











     








  0.0071 
(.591) 
   






      0.0058 
(.642) 
 
Characteristics of the bidder and target, the M&A deal, and the 
bidder and target countries 
No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes   
Intercept  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes   
Heckman λ (Mill’s ratio)  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes   
Adjusted-R
2  2.13%  5.87%  4.65%  5.71%  4.54%  4.17%     36 
Table 9. The impact of corporate governance regulation on the target CARs in cross-border M&As 
 
This table reports the results of the OLS regression of the target CARs for the sample of cross-border takeovers. The dependent 
variable is the target CARs [-1, +1]. Variable definitions are given in Appendix I. Seven different specifications are estimated. A 
Heckman sample selection is applied to correct for potential biases due to the target endogenous choice of participating in a cross-
border (rather than domestic) takeover or not. For each variable show the heteroskedasticity-consistent p-value. a/ b/ c stand for 
statistical significance at 1%/ 5%/ 10%, respectively. 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Corporate Governance Regulation Effect: 








(.659)       





(.542)    0.0119 
(.569)     





      -0.0107 
(.332)   











(.001)       





(.596)    0.0557
 a 
(.005)     
(Target) Creditor Rights Index  0.0013 
(.890) 
0.0016 
(.891)        0.0010 
(.930)   
Bidder and Target Firms’ characteristics: 













































































































































































Bidder and Target Country characteristics: 
Same Language 

























(Target) log GNP per capita 












Difference (Bidder-Target) log GNP per capita 












(Target) Anti-Corruption Index 





















































               
Number of obs.  296  296  296  296  296  296  296 
Adjusted-R
2  10.21%  14.97%  15.03%  13.76%  13.36%  8.11%  9.15%   37 
Table 10. The impact of the corporate governance spillover effect on the target CARs in cross-border M&As. 
 
This table reports the results of the OLS regression of the target CARs for the sample of cross-border takeovers. The dependent 
variable is  the target CARs [-1, +1]. Variable definitions are  given in Appendix I. Six different specifications are  estimated.  A 
Heckman sample selection is applied to correct for potential biases due to the target endogenous choice of participating in a cross-
border (rather than domestic) takeover or not. We do not report the parameter estimates of the control variables, as they are similar to 
the ones reported in Table 9. The indicator ‘Yes’ denotes that a particular control variable is included in the regression and ‘No’ that it 
is not. Panel A reports the regression estimates of a differences-approach while Panel B reports the estimates of an indicator-variable 
approach. Variable definitions are given in Appendix I. For each variable we show the heteroskedasticity-consistent p-value. a/ b/ c 
stand for statistical significance at 1%/ 5%/ 10%, respectively. The number of observations is 296. 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)   
PANEL A. A DIFFERENCES-APPROACH 
Corporate Governance Regulation Effect: 











(.018)       





(.445)    0.0402
 b 
(.025)     





      0.0005 
(.968) 
 
Corporate Governance Spillover Effect: 











(.007)       





(.670)    0.0016 
(.928)     
Diff (Bidder – Target) Creditor Rights Index  -0.0089 
(.202) 
-0.0095 
(.224)        -0.0092 
(.228) 
 
Characteristics of the bidder and target, the M&A deal, and the 
bidder and target countries 
No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes   
Intercept  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes   
Heckman λ (Mill’s ratio)  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes   
Adjusted-R
2  10.18%  14.83%  14.75%  14.08%  13.70%  10.02%   
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)   
PANEL B. INDICATOR-VARIABLE APPROACH 
Corporate Governance Regulation Effect: 












     









   






    0.0041 
(.700) 
 
Positive Spillover by Law/ Spillover by Control hypotheses (Spillover form Bidder to Target): 














     








  0.0256 
(.519) 
   






      0.0597 
(.171) 
 
Bootstrapping hypothesis (Spillover from Target to Bidder): 










     








  -0.0086 
(.816) 
   






      0.1043 
(.101) 
 
Characteristics of the bidder and target, the M&A deal, and the 
bidder and target countries 
No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes   
Intercept  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes   
Heckman λ (Mill’s ratio)  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes   
Adjusted-R
2  11.71%  15.31%  15.53%  14.77%  12.99%  10.48%   
   38 
Table 11. The impact of corporate governance spillover on the bidder CARs in full and partial acquisitions. 
 
This table reports the results of the OLS regression of the bidder CARs for the samples of full and partial cross-border takeovers. The 
dependent  variable  is  the  bidder  CARs  [-1,  +1].  Variable  definitions  are  given  in  Appendix  I.  Four  different  specifications  are 
estimated. A Heckman sample selection is applied to correct for potential biases due to the bidder endogenous choice of participating 
in a cross-border (rather than domestic) takeover or not. We do not report the parameter estimates of the control variables , as they are 
similar to the ones reported in Table 7. The indicator ‘Yes’ denotes that a particular control variable is included in the regression and 
‘No’ that it is not. For each variable we show the heteroskedasticity-consistent p-value. a/ b/ c stand for statistical significance at 1%/ 
5%/ 10%, respectively. 
 
  M&A of 100% 
(Full Acquisitions) 
  M&A of less than 100% 
(Partial Acquisitions) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Corporate Governance Regulation Effect:                   

















  0.0019 
(.819) 




  0.0036 
(.741) 








   
Positive Spillover by Law/ Spillover by Control hypotheses (Spillover form Bidder to Target): 



























  0.0097 
(.487) 




  -0.0035 
(.968) 










   
Bootstrapping hypothesis (Spillover from Target to Bidder) 

























  0.0049 
(.786) 




  0.0076 
(.556) 










   
Characteristics of the bidder and target, the M&A deal, and 
the bidder and target countries 
No  Yes  Yes  Yes    No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Intercept  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Heckman λ (Mill’s ratio)  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of observations  292  292  292  292    356  356  356  356 
Adjusted-R
2  2.05%  4.05%  4.07%  3.27%    3.47%  4.29%  5.42%  3.59% 
   39 
Table 12. The impact of corporate governance spillover on the target CARs in full and partial acquisitions. 
 
This table reports the results of the OLS regression of the target CARs for the samples of full and partial cross-border takeovers. The 
dependent  variable  is  the  target  CARs  [-1,  +1].  Variable  definitions  are  given  in  Appendix  I.  Four  different  specifications  are 
estimated. A Heckman sample selection is applied to correct for potential biases due to the target endogenous choice of participating 
in a cross-border (rather than domestic) takeover or not. We do not report the parameter estimates of the control variables , as they are 
similar to the ones reported in Table 9. The indicator ‘Yes’ denotes that a particular control variable is included in the regression and 
‘No’ that it is not. For each variable we show the heteroskedasticity-consistent p-value. a/ b/ c stand for statistical significance at 1%/ 
5%/ 10%, respectively. 
 
  M&A of 100% 
(Full Acquisitions) 
  M&A of less than 100% 
(Partial Acquisitions) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Corporate Governance Regulation Effect:                   



























  0.0204 
(.075) 








   
Positive Spillover by Law/ Spillover by Control hypotheses (Spillover form Bidder to Target): 



























  -0.0235 
(.715) 




  -0.0329 
(.448) 










   
Bootstrapping hypothesis (Spillover from Target to Bidder) 





















  -0.0049 
(.917) 




  -0.0207 
(.674) 










   
Characteristics of the bidder and target, the M&A deal, and 
the bidder and target countries 
No  Yes  Yes  Yes    No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Intercept  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Heckman λ (Mill’s ratio)  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of observations  121  121  121  121    72  72  72  72 
Adjusted-R
2  12.13%  19.05%  18.34%  17.14%    13.73%  18.92%  20.14%  20.50% 
 